Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept by Shogren, Jason F. et al.
Economics Publications Economics
3-1994
Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and
Willingness to Accept
Jason F. Shogren
Iowa State University
Seung Y. Shin
Iowa State University
Dermot J. Hayes
Iowa State University, dhayes@iastate.edu
James B. Kliebenstein
Iowa State University, jklieben@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Agribusiness Commons, Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons,
Agricultural Economics Commons, and the Economics Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/10. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Digital Repository @ Iowa State University. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Iowa State University. For more information, please
contact digirep@iastate.edu.
American Economic Association
Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept
Author(s): Jason F. Shogren, Seung Y. Shin, Dermot J. Hayes and James B. Kliebenstein
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 255-270
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117981 .
Accessed: 01/04/2013 15:14
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
American Economic Review.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.91 on Mon, 1 Apr 2013 15:14:46 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay 
and Willingness To Accept 
By JASON F. SHOGREN, SEUNG Y. SHIN, DERMOT J. HAYES, 
AND JAMES B. KLIEBENSTEIN * 
This paper tests the conjecture that the divergence of willingness to pay (WTP) 
and willingness to accept (WTA) for identical goods is driven by the degree of 
substitution between goods. In contrast to well-known results for market goods 
with close substitutes (i.e., candy bars and coffee mugs), our results indicate a 
convergence of WTP and WTA measures of value. However, for a nonmarket 
good with imperfect substitutes (i.e., reduced health risk), the divergence of WTP 
and WTA value measures is persistent, even with repeated market participation 
and full information on the nature of the good. (JEL D10, C91) 
Over the past decade, a consistent and 
frustrating pattern of empirical evidence has 
accumulated suggesting a significant diver- 
gence of willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures 
of value, where individuals buy an object, 
and willingness-to-accept (WTA) measures 
of value, where individuals sell the same 
object. Field-contingent valuation studies 
first uncovered the pattern, and laboratory 
markets have confirmed that the divergence 
is persistent (see e.g., Judd Hammack and 
Gardner M. Brown, Jr., 1974; Robert D. 
Rowe et al., 1980; Jack L. Knetsch and John 
A. Sinden, 1984; David S. Brookshire and 
Don L. Coursey, 1987). The divergence is 
troubling in that the interpretation of stan- 
dard theory predicts that with small income 
effects WTP and WTA should be equiva- 
lent, or at least within a tight bound (see 
Robert Willig, 1976; Alan Randall and John 
R. Stoll, 1980). Moreover, since valuation 
measures are used for the study of many 
public-policy questions, these results raise 
questions about which procedure to use in 
practice. The evidence that WTA measures 
significantly exceed WTP measures suggests 
a need to reexamine the analytical founda- 
tions of value measures. 
In response, Michael W. Hanemann 
(1991) has offered a straightforward expla- 
nation of why the value divergence occurs 
and by how much. By recognizing that sub- 
stitution effects have a more important role 
than previously realized, Hanemann dem- 
onstrated that the divergence can range 
from zero to infinity, depending on the de- 
gree of substitution between goods and given 
a positive income elasticity. Hanemann 
showed that one should only expect conver- 
gence of WTP and WTA value measures 
when the good in question has a very close 
substitute. When the good has an imperfect 
substitute, a value divergence will exist and 
will expand as the degree of substitution 
decreases. 
This paper tests Hanemann's proposition 
in a nonhypothetical experimental auction 
market. Our results provide some support 
for his argument. We find that for two pri- 
vate market goods with a relatively close 
substitute (a candy bar and a coffee mug) 
* Shogren: Department of Economics, Iowa State 
University, Ames, IA 50011, and School of Forestry 
and Environmental Studies, Yale University, New 
Haven, CT 06511; Shin, Hayes, and Kliebenstein: De- 
partment of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, 
IA 50011. Tom Crocker, John Braden, and Helen 
Jensen provided helpful comments on experimental 
design. Young Park and Todd Holt supplied valuable 
research assistance. We gratefully acknowledge the fi- 
nancial support of the Food Safety Consortium. Two 
anonymous reviewers added comments that have im- 
proved the paper. All errors remain our own. This is 
Journal Paper No. J-14801 of the Iowa Agriculture and 
Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, IA (Pro- 
ject No. 2994). 
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the divergence of WTP and WTA value 
measures disappears with repeated expo- 
sure to the market. In contrast, for a private 
nonmarket good with no close substitute 
(reduction of human health risk) the diver- 
gence is robust and persistent, even given 
repeated market participation and full in- 
formation on the characteristics of the good. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section I 
describes our general experimental design 
in terms of Hanemann's model. Sections II 
and III outline the experimental procedures 
and results. Section IV describes a second 
experiment that explores the relationship 
between the substitution effect and the en- 
dowment effect. Our conclusions are of- 
fered in Section V. 
I. Substitution Effects and the General 
Experimental Design 
Hanemann (1991) reconsidered the work 
of Randall and Stoll (1980) on value mea- 
sures given changed quantities of the good. 
He argued that the widely interpreted view 
of Randall and Stoll's result, which implies 
approximate equality between WTP and 
WTA is "misconceived." By recognizing that 
the difference in value measures depends 
on both income and substitution effects, 
Hanemann demonstrated that the fewer 
available substitutes the greater is the diver- 
gence between WTP and WTA. Intuitively, 
this conclusion makes a great deal of sense. 
One's willingness to accept compensation 
for a decrease in the level of a unique good, 
either private or public, need not equal 
one's willingness to pay for a good where 
one is constrained by income. 
To illustrate, assume that an individual 
derives utility, u = u(x, q), from consuming 
a numeraire good (x) and the good under 
consideration (q; e.g., candy bar, coffee mug, 
or health). In general, WTA will exceed 
WTP unless there is no income effect, in 
which case WTA equals WTP (see e.g., 
P. R. G. Layard and A. A. Walters, 1978 
pp. 150-53). The standard argument is that 
income effects are small for the changes 
measured in most valuation studies so this 
cannot account for the observed WTP- 
WVTA divergence. Randall and Stoll (1980) 
take this a step further, arguing that when 
goods are sold in competitive markets with 
zero transactions costs (i.e., candy bars and 
coffee mugs), the goods possess the charac- 
teristics of money, so there will be perfect 
substitutability. Perfect substitution implies 
a linear indifference curve for x and q (i.e., 
a frictionless intermediate monetary ex- 
change of commodity holdings). 
Consider Figure 1. The top panel shows 
the Randall and Stoll (1980) scenario where 
intermediate monetary adjustments create 
perfect substitution between the two goods. 
Here the WTA measure is the quantity of 
the numeraire good required to compensate 
the individual for forgoing a change in q 
from qo to q1. This is the amount AD which 
puts the individual on the higher indiffer- 
ence curve, but which maintains the original 
qo consumption level. The WTP measure is 
the quantity of the numeraire good that one 
can take from an individual after the change 
to ql, while still leaving him or her as well 
off as before. This amount is BC. Given 
perfect substitution, BC equals AD. This is 
Hanemann's (1991 p. 637) proposition 1. 
Note that Randall and Stoll (1980) also point 
out that, not only should WTP equal WTA, 
both should equal the average market sell- 
ing price of the good. 
Now consider the case of goods such as 
health, where markets are incomplete or 
goods are lumpy or indivisible. Hanemann's 
insight was that certain goods like health 
cannot be perfectly exchanged for money. 
There is friction in the market, thereby vio- 
lating Randall and Stoll's case of intermedi- 
ate monetary adjustments in commodity 
holdings. This leads to indifference curves 
of the standard shape, strictly convex to the 
origin.' Hanemann demonstrated that in the 
quantity-change case WTA will exceed 
WTP; the divergence depends on the in- 
come elasticity divided by the Allen-Uzawa 
elasticity of substitution. Therefore an in- 
crease in income elasticity or a decrease in 
1Randall and Stoll (1980) do recognize this possibil- 
ity (note their brief discussion on p. 452). 
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FIGURE 1. THE SIMPLE ANALYTICS OF THE WTA-WTP DIVERGENCE 
the degree of substitutability will increase 
the WTP-WTA divergence. 
Figure 1B illustrates. The assumption of 
health and wealth as imperfect substitutes is 
reflected by the curvature of the indiffer- 
ence curves. The individual's WTP to se- 
cure the new level of health, q1, keeping 
him at his original utility level, uo, is B'C'. 
In contrast, the compensation (WTA) re- 
quired to reach the new level of utility, u1, 
while remaining at the original health level, 
q0, is AD'. Note that AD' exceeds B'C', or 
WTA > WTP. As the degree of substi- 
tutability decreases, the trade-off between 
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health and wealth becomes less desirable, 
implying a greater divergence between WTP 
and WTA. 
We constructed the following general ex- 
perimental design to determine whether the 
degree of substitution significantly affects 
the divergence of value measures. For the 
case of perfect substitution, we used a 
regular-size brand-name candy bar. Because 
the candy bar is readily available in many 
marketing outlets including stores and vend- 
ing machines and because there are mini- 
mal transactions costs, the substitution pos- 
sibilities are essentially limitless. Therefore, 
if the degree of substitution is indeed criti- 
cal, the value measures should converge with 
repeated market participation. In addition, 
both value measures should be close to the 
average market price. 
For the case of low substitution, we auc- 
tioned a nonmarket good represented by 
reduced risk from food-borne illness. We 
hypothesize that individuals should have a 
relatively low, or zero, degree of substitu- 
tion between health and all other commodi- 
ties as represented by wealth. If Hanemann's 
conjecture is correct, we expect the WTA 
measures of value to be significantly greater 
than the WTP measures. The following 
proposition summarizes our test. 
PROPOSITION 1 (Convergence Proposi- 
tion): Given positive income elasticity and 
repeated market participation, the WTP and 
WTA measures of value will converge for the 
market good with close substitutes (candy 
bar) but will not converge for the nonmarket 
good with imperfect substitutes (reduced 
health risk from food-borne pathogens). In 
addition, the value measures for the market 
good should be related to the average selling 
price in the market. 
If we can reject the convergence proposi- 
tion, then we cannot support Hanemann's 
argument. In this case, other explanations 
such as the endowment effect or loss-aver- 
sion become more attractive (see e.g., Daniel 
Kahneman et al., 1990). If we cannot reject 
the proposition, however, then we can offer 
support to the conjecture that the degree of 
substitution is a key to understanding the 
disparity between WTP and WTA measures 
of value. 
II. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was divided into two 
stages. Stage 1 was the market-good auc- 
tion. Stage 2 was the nonmarket-good auc- 
tion. Subjects participated in both stages 
either for the WTP or WTA experiment. 
See the Appendix for instructions for the 
WTP experiment. The WTA experiment was 
identical to the WTP experiment in all as- 
pects except for the value measure and ini- 
tial ownership of the good. 
In stage 1, each subject was provided an 
initial income of $3 and a small piece of 
candy. To facilitate learning and value for- 
mation, the auction was repeated over five 
trials. The number of trials was selected 
after pretesting to determining how quickly 
individual value measures stabilized. Note 
that to control wealth effects, we made the 
subjects fully aware that only one of the five 
trials was binding. The binding trial was 
selected at random by a Monte Carlo num- 
ber generator on a personal computer. In 
an attempt to elicit preference accurately 
we used a Vickrey second-price sealed-bid 
auction (see William Vickrey, 1961). The 
Vickrey auction has successfully elicited val- 
ues in various experimental settings (see 
Vikki Coppinger et al., 1980; Don L. 
Coursey, 1987; Shogren, 1990). 
The market good was a regular-size 
brand-name candy bar. Each subject was 
asked the maximum he or she would be 
willing to pay to upgrade the small piece of 
candy to the brand-name candy bar. For 
each trial, each subject recorded a bid on a 
recording card that was collected by the 
monitor. The highest bidder's identification 
number and the reigning price (the second- 
highest bid) were posted as public informa- 
tion on a blackboard. Each subject was given 
a $3 endowment in the candy-bar stage. 
Stage 2 was the nonmarket-good auction. 
The procedures were similar to those in 
stage 1, with some noted exceptions. Each 
participant was given an initial income of 
$15. Two types of food items were then 
shown to the subjects with a description of 
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each item. The first type was the test prod- 
uct, which represented food purchased from 
a local source with a typical chance of being 
contaminated with a food-borne pathogen 
from one-time consumption. Five food- 
borne pathogens were considered in five 
separate experimental sessions: Campy- 
lobacter, Salmonella, Staphylococcus aureus, 
Trichinella spiralis, and Clostridium perfrin- 
gens.2 All five pathogens occur in the United 
States. The test product was provided to 
every participant as a free lunch. The sec- 
ond food type was stringently screened food. 
The stringently screened food had been 
tested for food-borne pathogens and had a 
low probability (one in 100 million) of caus- 
ing food-borne illness. 
Each participant was then asked the max- 
imum he or she would be willing to pay to 
upgrade the test product to the screened 
food product. The bidding procedure was 
the same as that used in stage 1 except that 
there were 20 trials in stage 2. "Naive" bids 
were elicited in the first ten trials. The bids 
were naive in that the subjects were not 
given any information on the actual proba- 
bilities of contracting a food-borne illness 
from consuming the typical food product. 
After the tenth trial, the monitor supplied 
three items of information: (a) the objective 
probability of becoming ill from eating a 
year's supply of the typical food product; (b) 
a description of the severity of the illness; 
and (c) the symptoms and average medical 
costs of a mild case of infection. For 
Salmonella, the following information was 
provided (see John V. Bennett et al., 1987; 
Roberts, 1989): 
Description of Salmonellosis: Symp- 
toms are those of a mild flu-like in- 
testinal disease of short duration with 
abdominal pains, nausea, vomiting, 
and diarrhea. The actual individual 
chance of infection of salmonellosis is 
1 in 125 annually. Of those individuals 
who get sick, 1 individual out of 1,000 
will die annually. The average cost for 
medical expenses and productivity 
losses from a mild case of salmonel- 
losis is $220. 
Given this information, "informed" bids 
were elicited in trials 11-20. 
The computer randomly selected one of 
the 20 trials as binding. The highest bidder 
paid the displayed second-highest bidding 
price and ate the stringently screened food. 
The highest bidder's take-home income was 
$15 minus the price paid for the screened 
food product. The other bidders ate the test 
product and took home $15. Note that the 
subjects had to eat the food item to leave 
the experiment with the take-home income. 
Table 1 summarizes the experimental de- 
sign for both the WTP and WTA exper- 
iments. One hundred forty-two subjects 
participated in the experiment. Each experi- 
mental session included between 12 and 15 
subjects. All were undergraduate and grad- 
uate students from Iowa State University 
(ISU), recruited campus-wide. Note that a 
subject participated in either the WTA or 
the WTP experiment, not both. Also, each 
subject was only confronted with one food- 
borne pathogen description, not all five, re- 
gardless of whether that subject was in the 
WTA or the WTP experiment. After each 
subject read the instructions and answered 
a set of questions to test his or her under- 
standing of the experiment and the monitor 
answered all relevant questions, the experi- 
ment began. All experiments were con- 
ducted in the ISU meat-testing laboratory 
with modern kitchen facilities. The ISU 
meat lab conducts food-tasting experiments 
on a regular basis. The lab is actively in- 
volved in all aspects of meat processing and 
handling, thereby providing a unique setting 
for our experiment. 
III. Results and Discussion 
Overall, we cannot reject the convergence 
proposition. Table 2 and Figure 2 illustrate 
that the WTP and WTA measures of value 
for the market good were not significantly 
different, with the exception of the first 
2We report results for all five pathogens because 
measures of consumers' WTA and WTP to reduce or 
eliminate these pathogens are interesting in their own 
right (see Tanya Roberts and David Smallwood, 1991). 
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TABLE 1-SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Experiment 
Procedure Willingness to pay (WTP) Willingness to accept (WTA) 
Stage 1 (market good; five trials; Vickrey second-price, sealed-bid auction; one trial binding): 
Initial conditions $3 income; small piece of candy $3 income; regular-size brand-name 
candy bar 
Auctioned good regular-size brand-name candy bar small-piece of candy 
Value measure WTP to exchange piece of candy WTA to exchange candy bar for small 
for candy bar piece of candy 
Stage 2 (nonmarket good; 20 trials [10 naive, 10 informed]; one trial binding; Vickrey auction; five food-borne 
pathogens [Campylobacter, Salmonella, Staphylococcus aureus, Trichinella spiralis, Clostridium perfringens]): 
Initial conditions $15 income; typical food product with $15 income; stringently screened food 
average health risk from food-borne 
pathogens 
Auctioned good stringently screened food with one in 100 typical food product 
million chance of health risk from 
food-borne pathogen 
Value measure WTP to exchange typical food product WTA to exchange screened food 
for screened food product product for typical food product 
TABLE 2-COMPARISON OF MEAN WTP AND WTA IN CANDY-BAR EXPERIMENT 
Ho: WTP =WTA 
H1: WTP < WTA 
Value Mean ($) 
measure Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial S 
WTP 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.39 
(0.36) (0.20) (0.23) (0.19) (0.20) 
WTA 0.51 0.44 0.39 0.37 0.37 
(0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) 
t:a - 1.81** -1.19 0.22 0.55 0.57 
U:. 4,047.5** 4,607 5,185* 5,342** 5,332.5** 
Notes: The sample size for the WTP experiments was n = 68; the sample size for the 
WTA experiment was n = 74. Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. 
aOne-tailed t test. 
bMann-Whitney U test. 
*Ho rejected at the 5-percent significance level. 
**Ho rejected at the 1-percent significance level. 
trial. The mean values and standard devia- 
tions by trial are presented in the table. 
Repeated participation in the auction mar- 
ket caused the values to converge (also see 
Coursey et al. [1987]). Trial 1 represents the 
inexperienced bid analogous to the 
contingent-valuation method. The average 
WTP-WTA difference in the initial bid 
equaled 11 cents, and the null hypothesis 
that WTP and WTA were equal is rejected 
at the 5-percent significance level. The value 
disparity converged, however, to a differ- 
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FIGURE 2. WTP AND WTA COMPARISON: 
CANDY BARS 
ence of 6 cents in trial 2, which is not 
statistically significant. By trials 3, 4, and 5, 
the average WTP and WTA values con- 
verged to differences between 1 cent and 3 
cents. We cannot reject the hypothesis of 
equality of the WTP and WTA measures. In 
addition, the results in Table 2 support 
Randall and Stoll's (1980) prediction that 
the value for goods with limitless substitu- 
tion will also converge to the average mar- 
ket price. Because we are exchanging a small 
piece of candy worth about 10 cents for a 
candy bar worth about 50 cents, the ob- 
served average value near 40 cents is strik- 
ing. With perfect substitution, value mea- 
sures converged, and they converged on the 
average market price. 
Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 3-7 illustrate 
that the majority of the WTA measures for 
TABLE 3-COMPARISON OF WTP AND WTA FOR FIVE PATHOGENS WITHOUT ELIMINATION 
H0: WTP = WTA 
Pathogen HH1: WTP < WTA 
(probability Value Inexperienced (lst trial) Naive (trials 7-10) Informed (trials 17-20) 
of illness) measure Mean ($) t U Mean ($) t U Mean ($) t U 
Campylobacter WTP 0.60 0.71 0.86 
(1/125,143) (0.50) -3.65** 141** (0.43) I 1.57* 201 (0.38) - 1.84** 228 
WTA 5.06 J 2.36 J 3.03 J 
(4.55) 1(3.89) (4.39)J 
Salmonella WTP 0.61 0.44 0.55 
(1/137,000) (0.53) -1.20 136.5** (0.23) -1.15 120** (0.25) - 2.04** 156** 
WTA 8,029 j 8.01 1.62 
(25,957) (25.46) (2.00) 
Staphylococcus WTP 0.97 0.92 0.84 
aureus (0.39) -2.25** 140** (0.32) - 1.40** 187 (0.33) -1.04 170.5 
(1/173,694) WTA 5.55 3.89 56.2 
(7.86)/ (8.19) (205.87) 
Trichinella WTP 0.48 0.69 0.81 
spiralis (0.42) - 1.93** 115** (0.46) - 1.50** 155** (0.55) -1.31 172.5 
(1/2,628,000) WTA 12.8 ( 10.51 18.0 
(24.80) (25.36) (50.82) 
Clostridium WTP 0.64 0.58 0.42 
perfringens (0.63) -2.26** 111** (0.41) -3.77** 109.5** (0.33) -4.00** 91** 
(1/26,280,000) WTA 30.2 1.98 2.21 
(50.56) (1.37) (1.70) 
Notes: Sample sizes are as follows: Camplyobacter (WTP = 15, WTA = 14), Salmonella (WTP = 15, WTA = 15), 
Staphylococcus aureus (WTP = 12, WTA = 15), Trichinella spiralis (WTP = 13, WTA = 15), Clostridium perfringens 
(WTP = 13, WTA-= 15). Columns for t and U report results of one-tailed t tests and Mann-Whitney U tests, 
respectively. Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. 
*Ho rejected at the 5-percent significance level. 
**Ho rejected at the 1-percent significance level. 
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TABLE 4-COMPARISON OF WTP AND WTA FOR FivE PATHOGENS WITH ELIMINATION 
H0: WTP = WTA 
Pat'hogen H1: WTP < WTA 
(probability Value Inexperienced (lst trial) Naive (trials 7-10) Informed (trials 17-20) 
of illness) measure Mean ($) t U Mean ($) t U Mean ($) t U 
Campylobacter WTP 0.53 0.71 0.88 
(1/125,143) (0.31) - 3.87** 100** (0.36) - 1.58* 150 (0.32) - 1.61* 177 
WTA 4.63 1.50 2.29 
(3.65) (1.70) (3.02) 
Salmonella WTP 0.55 0.44 0.56 
(1/137,000) (0.38) -1.02 96** (0.20) -4.00** 91** (0.22) - 1.91** 114** 
WTA 1,572 j 1.49 1 1.23 
(5.537)1 (0.92) (1.25) 
Staphylococcus WTP 1.02 0.97 1 0.91 
aureus (0.26) - 2.63** 100 (0.21) -0.99 143* (0.23) -1.19 127.5 
(1/173,694) WTA 4.08 3.12 3.33 
(4.19) (7.81) (7.37) 
Trichinella WTP 0.44 0.69 0.82 
spiralis (0.31) - 4.03** 78** (0.44) -2.32** 110* (0.51) - 2.26** 128.5 
(1/2,628,000) WTA 7.08 4.43 5.42 
(5.93) (5.79) (7.33) 
Clostridium WTP 0.57 0.60 0.43 
perfringens (0.49)\ -3.47** 78** (0.38) -3.67** 76.5** (0.32) -4.11** 66** 
(1/26,280,000) WTA 19.4 1.83 | 2.00 
(19.51) (1.14) (1.34)/ 
Notes: Sample sizes are as follows: Camplyobacter (WTP = 13, WTA = 12), Salmonella (WTP = 13, WTA = 13), 
Staphylococcus aureus (WTP = 10, WTA = 13), Trichinella spiralis (WTP = 11, WTA = 13), Clostridium perfringens 
(WTP = 11, WTA = 13). Columns for t and U report results of one-tailed t tests and Mann-Whitney U tests, 
respectively. Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. 
*Denotes rejection of Ho at the 5-percent significance level. 
**Denotes rejection of Ho at the 1-percent significance level. 
the nonmarket good significantly exceed the 
WTP measures. This holds for both the 
naive bids (trials 7-10) and the informed 
bids (trials 17-20). Note that the WTP and 
WTA measures for each pathogen are ex- 
amined with two mean values: without elim- 
ination of the highest and lowest bids and 
with elimination. Again mean values and 
standard deviations are presented in the 
tables. We consider elimination to explore 
Robin Gregory and Lita Furby's (1987) ar- 
gument that values are extremely sensitive 
to one or two outliers (also see Robert C. 
Mitchell and Richard T. Carson [1989]). This 
work reexamined Coursey et al.'s (1987) su- 
crose octa-acetate (SOA) experiment with 
elimination of outliers and found that the 
results of value convergence depend on in- 
clusion of an outlier. To illustrate the ro- 
bustness of our results, we consider values 
with and without the elimination of outliers. 
Means of the WTP experiment without 
elimination of outliers closely coincided with 
the means with elimination. In the WTA 
experiment, outliers change the majority of 
the mean values, especially for Salmonella, 
Staphylococcus aureus, and Trichinella spi- 
ralis. For the initial bid in trial 1, we ob- 
served extremely high WTA values. For 
Salmonella, the mean WTA is more than 
13,000 times greater than the mean WTP 
without elimination and is still 3,000 times 
greater with elimination. WTA for Clostrid- 
ium perfringens is 47 times greater than 
WTP without elimination. WTA divergence 
for the other pathogens ranges from four to 
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34 times greater than that for WTP in trial 
1. For the initial bid, we performed a one- 
tailed t test and the Mann-Whitney rank- 
sum U test to test the significance of the 
divergence of VvTP and WTA. According to 
the rank-sum test, the null hypothesis of all 
pathogens, that WVTP and W-TA values are 
from the same parental population, is re- 
jected at the 5-percent significance level. 
For most of the naive bids (trials 7-10), 
the average bidding prices stay relatively 
constant in both the WTP and the WTA 
bids. This result is consistent with Coursey's 
(1987) observation that Vickrey auctions 
usually stabilize by the sixth or seventh trial. 
The mean WTA for trials 7-10 ranges from 
approximately three times greater than that 
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of the mean WTP for Campylobacter to 
approximately 18 times greater than that of 
the mean WTP for Salmonella without elim- 
ination. With elimination of outliers, the 
results indicate that the mean WTA is from 
two to six times greater than the mean 
WTP. The disparities between WTP and 
WTA for each pathogen are tested by per- 
forming a multivariate analysis3 and a U 
test. Although the WTP and WTA experi- 
ments are statistically independent, we used 
multivariate analysis to account for the 
between-trial correlation among bids from 
the same subjects. For most pathogens, the 
difference between WTP and WTA in the 
naive bids is statistically significant, based 
on t tests, both with and without elimina- 
tion of outliers. The WTP-WTA difference 
for the Salmonella experiment is statistically 
insignificant according to a test without 
elimination, but significant with elimination. 
For the informed bids (trials 17-20), we 
observed that bids initially increased from 
the information shock. The WTP experi- 
ments have a smaller increase relative to 
the WTA experiments. Again, after six trials 
with information, the mean WTP bid stabi- 
lizes. Mean WTA bids converge to lower 
values, with some variation in the last two 
or three trials. For trials 17-20, the differ- 
ences between WTP and WTA range from 
threefold to fivefold for Salmonella, Campy- 
lobacter, and Clostridium perfringens. The 
WTP and WTA bids for these three 
pathogens are statistically significant with 
and without elimination of outliers. 
Trichinella spiralis bids were significantly 
different with elimination, but not different 
without. Staphylococcus aureus bids were 
not significantly different, either with or 
without elimination. 
In sum, we cannot reject the convergence 
proposition. For the market good with close 
substitutes, WTP and WTA measures of 
value are not statistically different with re- 
peated market exposure. In contrast, for the 
nonmarket good with imperfect substitutes, 
WTP and WTA measures are significantly 
different, even after repeated market partic- 
ipation and with full information about the 
probability and severity of the health risk. 
Our results support Hanemann's (1991) 
proposition that the degree of substitution 
drives the divergence between value mea- 
sures. 
IV. Substitution versus Endowment Effects 
An alternative explanation of the 
WTP-WTA divergence has been put forth 
by Kahneman et al. (1990). They argue that 
there may be a fundamental "endowment 
effect" underlying the theory of choice (also 
see Knetsch [1989]). The endowment effect 
exists when an individual becomes attached 
to the good because he or she is often 
rewarded for doing so in many contexts. 
This attachment induces the individual to 
demand a higher level of compensation than 
he or she was originally willing to pay. 
The inability to substitute goods may be 
the underlying motivation behind Kahne- 
man et al.'s (1990) observations of an en- 
dowment effect. They recognize this possi- 
bility, stating that "... endowment effects 
will almost certainly occur when owners are 
faced with an opportunity to sell an item 
purchased for use that is not easily replace- 
able" (p. 1344). If the endowment effect was 
not driven by substitutability, we should have 
observed a divergence in value measures for 
the candy bar, which we did not. 
3Let Xijk be the subject's kth bid in the jth trial of 
the ith group, with i = 1,2 (i = 1, WTP experiment; 
i= 2, WTA experiment), j = 7,8,9,10 (trial), and k = 
1, 2,..., ni (number of subjects in experiment). Because 
Xijk and Xij,k (j * j') are not independent (measured 
repeatedly), multivariable analysis or split plot design 
can be applied. Suppose vector X =_ 
(Xi7, Xi,9 Xi 10Y (i = 1, 2) MVN(ui, vi) where 
Pi -i,77 . * Ai, 10Y and where Xi is the correspond- 
ing variance-covariance matrix. Consider Yl a'X 
where a' = 1, 1, 1,1)' (i = 1, 2). Then Y1 = (X17 + 
X1,8+ X1,9+ Xl,lo) and Y2 = 1(X2,7+ X2,8+ X2,9+ 
X2, 10) are normally distributed with mean a'p,u and 
a'ju2 and variance a'lla and a'12a, respectively. Be- 
cause Y1 and Y2 are independent, (Y1 - Y2) is normally 
distributed with mean (a'jui - a',u2) and variance 
(a'Y1a + a'X2a). There are n1 and n2 samples from the 
WTP and the WTA experiments, respectively (i.e., 
using y1,1,... Y,n, and Y2,1,-..Y2,n2)- 
To test the null hypothesis that there is a difference 
between the WTP and WTA experiments, we can use 
the t test for the difference of the mean between the 
WTP and WTA experiments (see Richard A. Johnson 
and Dean W. Wichern, 1988). 
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At the request of a reviewer, we ran an 
additional experiment to explore more rig- 
orously the relationship between the substi- 
tution effect and the endowment effect. 
Kahneman et al.'s work suggests that per- 
haps an endowment effect can exist for a 
good with available substitutes if the sub- 
jects have less information on its value and 
cost. For a Cornell coffee mug available at 
the campus store, Kahneman et al. (1990) 
observed sellers demanding twice the com- 
pensation that buyers were willing to pay, a 
pattern that remained unchanged with mar- 
ket experience (see their tables 3 and 4, pp. 
1334-35). Because we did not observe an 
endowment effect for our candy-bar treat- 
ments, this suggests a potential threshold 
where the importance or size of the endow- 
ment drives behavior. 
To test for a possible endowment effect 
we repeated our experiment, but the auc- 
tioned good was now an Iowa State coffee 
mug available from the campus bookstore 
for $5.20. All design aspects followed as 
closely as possible to our earlier experi- 
ments: a Vickrey auction, 15 subjects per 
treatment, mugs placed directly in the sub- 
ject's hands, a $15 initial endowment, and 
repeated market participation (ten trials for 
the ISU mug stage). In addition, we repli- 
cated the initial candy-bar stage ($3 initial 
endowment and five trials) to maintain con- 
sistency with the food-borne pathogen treat- 
ments. The baseline treatment was a WTP 
auction that allowed the highest bidder to 
upgrade his or her plain plastic mug (worth 
$1.60) for an ISU mug. We compared two 
WTA treatments to the WTP baseline. The 
first treatment was a WTA auction where 
the low bidder would receive compensation 
(second-lowest bid) for exchanging his or 
her ISU mug for a plain mug. The second 
treatment was identical to the first, except 
now subjects were told they could purchase 
(at the market price) an unlimited number 
of ISU mugs right outside the door immedi- 
ately after the experiment. This eliminated 
any transaction costs that could create fric- 
tion in trade. Our hypothesis is summarized 
below. 
PROPOSITION 2 (Endowment Proposi- 
tion): If the endowment effect exists, then the 
willingness to accept compensation will exceed 
the willingness to pay for the market good 
(Iowa State coffee mug) with or without zero 
transactions costs. 
If we observe a persistent divergence of 
value measures with repeated market expe- 
rience, a fundamental endowment effect 
may well exist in goods that have available 
substitutes but have some degree of uncer- 
tainty regarding value and cost. However, if 
we observe a convergence of value measures 
for both treatments, we can reject the en- 
dowment proposition. Our results then cast 
doubt on the generality of Kahneman 
et al.'s evidence and provide more support 
for Hanemann's argument on the impor- 
tance of the substitution effect. 
Overall, we reject the endowment propo- 
sition. Table 5 and Figure 8 illustrate the 
results for all subjects. Although for the 
initial trial mean WTA exceeds mean WTP 
by ratios of 2.74 and 2.76 to 1 for the two 
treatments, by trial 4 the ratio nearly equals 
unity: 1.03 and 1.06. Clearly, the value mea- 
sures converged, a pattern generally consis- 
tent in the remaining trials. Considering the 
last three experienced trials (trials 8-10), 
the WTA/WTP ratio equals 1.08 and 1.05 
for the two treatments. We cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of equality of WTP and 
WTA either without or with elimination of 
outliers at the 5-percent level (without elim- 
ination, t = -0.2412 and t = - 0.1509 for 
treatments 1 and 2; with elimination, t = 
0.1768 and t = 0.3813 for treatments 1 and 
2). This holds for the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test as well (Z = 0.996, Z = 0.975, Z = 1.103, 
and Z = 1.206 for treatments 1 and 2 with- 
out and with elimination).4 
We do not observe a fundamental endow- 
ment effect under our experimental proce- 
dures, contrary to the findings reported by 
Kahneman et al. (1990). There are numer-- 
ous differences between our experimental 
4Note that the stage-1 candy-bar experiments fol- 
lowed an identical pattern to the earlier runs. In trial 1, 
the average WTA was $0.73 while the average WTP 
was $0.38. But by trial 3, average WTA and WTP 
equaled $0.37 and $0.36. Again, values converged, and 
they converged to the differential market price. 
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TABLE 5-COMPARISON OF MEAN WTP AND WTA BIDS (IN DOLLARS) IN MUG TREATMENTS 
Trial 
Treatment n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
WTP, baseline 15 2.37 2.40 2.89 2.90 2.70 2.86 2.74 2.62 2.68 3.09 
without mug sale (1.484) (1.275) (1.111) (1.072) (1.047) (1.139) (1.022) (1.291) (1.187) (1.357) 
WTA, without 15 6.55 4.17 3.19 3.06 2.88 4.14 3.53 3.25 3.12 2.30 
ISU mug sale (4.894) (3.261) (2.990) (2.401) (1.903) (5.125) (3.411) (3.632) (2.522) (1.970) 
WTA, with 15 6.50 4.74 3.67 2.98 3.27 3.75 2.65 3.13 3.29 2.49 
ISU mug sale (4.452) (4.147) (3.202) (3.104) (3.262) (4.331) (2.746) (3.010) (3.135) (2.175) 
Note: Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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ISU MUGS (AVERAGE VALUES) 
design and that of Kahneman et al., and our 
use of the Vickrey auction may play a role 
(see e.g., John H. Kagel et al. [1987] on 
overbidding). Regardless of why our results 
differ from Kahneman et al., we observe the 
convergence of WTP and WTA values for 
the candy-bar and coffee-mug treatments 
but a persistent divergence in the values for 
the food-borne pathogen treatments. Hane- 
mann's (1991) substitution effect appears to 
organize observed valuation behavior in a 
predictable fashion. Future research should 
continue to compare how alternative elicita- 
tion mechanisms affect revealed-values in 
experimental markets, holding constant 
monetary incentives, opportunity for market 
expbrience, subject pools, and the auctioned 
or traded good. 
V. Conclusion 
The divergence in WTP and WTA mea- 
sures of value has troubled economists for 
the past decade. The divergence led Ronald 
G. Cummings et al. (1986) to recommend in 
their "reference operating conditions" (pp. 
102-9) for contingent valuation of environ- 
mental goods that only WTP measures be 
elicited in the attempt to value nonmarket 
goods. Hanemann (1991) has offered an ex- 
planation grounded in economic theory that 
may calm the fears that the divergence is 
some form of cognitive mistake. Our experi- 
mental results support his argument that 
the degree of substitutability between goods 
may drive the difference between WTA and 
WTP measures of value. For market goods 
with close substitutes which are readily 
available in commercial outlets with mini- 
mal transaction costs (i.e., candy bars and 
coffee mugs), we find that WTP and WTA 
value measures converge. In contrast, for a 
nonmarket good with no close substitutes 
(i.e., reduced health risk), the value mea- 
sures diverge and persist, even with re- 
peated market participation and full infor- 
mation on the nature of the good. 
Further research on discrepancies be- 
tween willingness-to-pay and willingness- 
to-accept measures of valuation is clearly 
needed. First, researchers should replicate 
our experiment to test the robustness of our 
findings. Second, researchers should im- 
prove the understanding of substitutability 
when conducting field studies in nonmarket 
valuation. As shown by Brookshire and 
Coursey (1987), wild discrepancies in mea- 
sures of value may well be only an artifact 
of survey methods that do not employ re- 
peated market experience and real pay- 
ments. However, with truly unique private 
or public goods that have limited substi- 
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tutes, Hanemann predicts a wide divergence in question could improve the correspon- 
of value. Defining an individual-specific in- dence between economic theory and ob- 
dex of substitution for the nonmarket good served phenomena. 
APPENDIX 
Experimental Instructions [Exact Transcript] 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision making. Please follow the 
instructions carefully. The United States Department of Agriculture has provided funds for 
this research. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment, you will be asked to decide how much you would be willing to pay for 
safer food [to decide the minimum amount you would be willing to accept for taking the test 
product food, instead of keeping your safer food]. The experiment has two stages. 
Your starting income will be $3 in stage 1. Your income will be $15 for stage 2. Your 
take-home income will consist of your initial income ($3+$15) minus [plus] the values of 
goods purchased. 
You will submit your bidding price on a recording card. Note only one of the trials in 
stage 1 will be binding and only one of the twenty trials in stage 2 will be binding. A number 
will be randomly selected to identify these binding trials. 
You cannot reveal your bids to any other participant. Any communication between 
bidders during a trial will result in an automatic penalty of $3. 
STAGE 1 
Step 1: You own the candy [candy bar] free in front of you. Your initial income is $3. 
Step 2: Let's say you are willing to pay $X for the piece of candy and $Y for a candy bar. 
The difference ($Y - $X) is what you are willing to pay to upgrade your piece of candy for 
a candy bar. Please indicate your willingness to pay to trade the piece of candy for a candy 
bar. Do not state what you would pay for an entire candy bar. Only state the difference 
($Y - $X) you are willing to pay. 
Step 3: Please write your bid (difference) for the one candy bar on the recording card. The 
monitor will announce the highest bidder and display the price of the candy bar 
(second-highest bidding price) on the blackboard. 
Note: For example, if the highest bid was $a and the second-highest was $,3, the highest 
bidder would receive the candy bar and must pay $,3. 
Step 4: There will be five trials. 
Step 5: Only one trial will be binding. After the five trials, a number will be randomly 
selected to determine which trial is binding. The highest bidder of that trial will exchange 
the piece of candy for the candy bar and must pay the displayed price (i.e., the 
second-highest bid). 
Note: In the event that there is a tie for the highest bid, those participants will be asked to 
bid again. 
Questions 
Please answer the following questions, which are designed to help you understand stage 1. 
Do not hesitate to ask the researchers if you have questions. 
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1. Suppose that person A is the highest bidder in the first trial, person B is the highest 
bidder in third trial, and person C is the highest bidder in fifth trial. If, after five trials are 
finished, we randomly select the third trial, then who will purchase the candy bar? 
2. If your $a bid is the highest in the third trial, and the second-highest bid is $,3, what price 
will you pay for the candy bar? $ 
3. If your bid is not the highest in the third trial, which is randomly selected, how much 
should you pay for the piece of candy? $ 
STAGE 2 
Step 1: There are two types of food. The features are each described below. 
Test Product Stringently Screened 
This food has a typical chance This food has been subjected to 
of being contaminated with the stringent screening for 
food-borne pathogen Salmonella; Salmonella. There is a 1 in 
i.e., it is purchased from a 100,000,000 chance of getting 
local source. salmonellosis from consuming 
Step 2: You own a test product sandwich free in front of you. Everyone has the same 
sandwich. You also have initial income, $15. 
Step 3: Let's say you are willing to pay $X for the test product sandwich and $Y for the 
stringently screened sandwich. The difference ($Y - $X) is what you are willing to pay to 
reduce the risk of illness from the food-borne pathogens. Please indicate your willingness 
to pay to reduce the risk of illness. Do not state what you would pay for the entire 
stringently screened sandwich. Only state the difference ($Y - $X) you are willing to pay. 
The highest bidder will upgrade his or her test product sandwich for the stringently 
screened sandwich. He or she will pay the second-highest bidder's price. 
Step 4: There will be twenty trials. 
Step 5: After all twenty trials are complete, we will randomly select one binding trial to 
determine who buys the stringently screened food. 
Note: The sandwich has to be eaten to leave with the take-home income. 
Questions 
Please answer the following questions, which are designed to help you understand stage 2. 
Do not hesitate to ask the researchers if you have questions. 
1. There are twenty bidding trials. If person A is the highest bidder in the first trial, person 
B is the highest bidder in the eighteenth trial, and the eighteenth trial is selected, then 
who will receive the stringently screened food? 
2. If your $a bid is the highest in the eighteenth trial, and the second highest bid is $,1, what 
price will you pay for the stringently screened food? $ 
Nota Please answer the questions below. 
1. What do you think is the chance of becoming ill from Salmonella, given that you eat an 
average amount of typical food products in the United States over one year? 
Answer: __chance out of 1 million people 
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2. What do you think are the important sources of the food-borne pathogen, Salmonella, in 
the United States? 
Please list the type of food items. 
Information for Trials 11-20 
Test Product Stringently Screened 
If you eat this food, there is a 1 This food has been subjected to 
in 137,000 chance that you will stringent screening for 
become ill from Salmonella. Salmonella. There is a 1 in 
100,000,000 chance of getting 
salmonellosis from consuming 
this food. 
Description of Salmonellosis: 
Symptoms are those of a mild "flu-like" intestinal disease of short duration with abdominal 
pains, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. The actual individual choice of infection of Salmonel- 
losis is 1 in 125 annually. Of those individuals who get sick, 1 individual out of 1,000 will die 
annually. The average cost for medical expenses and productivity losses from a mild case of 
Salmonellosis is $220. 
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